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Michael M. Sheng, Battling Western Imperialism: Mao, Stalin, and the United 
States (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997). 
Michael Sheng's Battling Western Imperialism is a revisionist work in several 
respects. Sheng claims that it was Joseph Stalin, not Mao Zedong, who made 
the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) foreign policy toward the United States 
from 1935 to 1949. He argues that past historical scholarship on CCP-Moscow 
relations overstated the case by suggesting that the relationship between Mao 
and Stalin was an antagonistic one because of Mao's nationalism which bridled 
at attempts by Stalin to impose his will on Mao and the CCP. Sheng writes that 
in fact Mao "followed Moscow's instruction step by step almost religiously 
throughout the pre- 1949 period," (7) even, according to Sheng, "when it went 
against Chinese national interests or the immediate interests of the CCP." (56) 
Mao was no nationalist, but an "International Communist" who was "loyal and 
obedient" to Stalin. Not merely because Mao needed military and economic 
aid from Moscow, but because of Mao's ideology. Mao and everyone else in 
the CCP believed in the notion of class struggle which identified the CCP with 
Moscow and the CCP "viewed its relations with the USSR as matters of 
"internal affairs" within the world socialist movement." (193) It was this 
ideology that "helped select the CCP's friends and enemies." Stalin was a 
friend; the United States, because it backed Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist 
government, was the enemy. 
It is in this framework that Sheng examines Mao as proxy for Stalin's 
policy toward the United States. In the years before Pearl Harbor, Mao feared 
American imperialism more than Japanese imperialism because the Japanese 
were the aggressors whereas the Americans, if they defeated Japan, would be 
seen as the liberators of China and China's bourgeoisie would support 
America's running dog, Chiang Kai-shek. Although the United States was "the 
master" backing Chiang, the CCP's main enemy, Mao sought to make friends 
with America in line with the Comintern's policy of creating "an antifacist 
world united front." However, Mao remained leery of American aid to Chiang. 
During World War 11, the CCP became pro-Americans overnight after 
Germany invaded the Soviet Union, but remained "suspicious of the U.S. 
imperialist nature." Sheng argues that Mao deftly used the United States to 
block Chiang's anti-CCP activities by convincing American foreign service 
officers that his policies were liberal. His goal was to use the Americans to 
pressure Chiang to make reforms, secure American military aid and expand the 
CCP's influence southward. 
After the war, Mao shifted his policy to a two-camp approach in which the 
CCP would align with Moscow against the Chiang-US alliance. Mao wanted 
to continue fighting the civil war, but Moscow said "no" fearing American 
intervention. When, to Mao's displeasure, Stalin suggested that Mao negotiate 
with Chiang Kai-shek, Mao did so albeit reluctantly. Thus, Mao adjusted his 
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policy to Moscow's tune because Stalin wanted him to do it: "when Stalin 
speaks, Mao listens and complies." (124) When the Cold War came to Asia in 
1947, Mao identified the United States as the CCP's enemy and formed an 
"anti-American international united front . . . in close coordination with Stalin's 
policy." (152) With secret Soviet backing, Mao restarted the civil war. When 
Mao won that war, Sheng argues that there was never any "lost chance" 
between the United States and Mao to reach a rapproachement "Mao's Beijing 
regime was born anti-American and pro-Soviet" and the alliance between Mao 
and Stalin "was only a logical extension of the history of CCP-Moscow 
relations in the decades prior to the proclamation of the PRC in 1949." (186) 
In writing this revisionist account, Sheng engages in a great deal of 
Mao debunking. He asserts that Mao's later claim that Stalin attempted to have 
Mao replaced as leader of CCP as ludicrous. "Mao was Moscow's chosen 
man" and it was the "unprecedented support and endorsement from Moscow 
that paved the way for Mao's rise to power." (20) True, Mao was successful in 
creating a "Mao cult" in the CCP, but "not at the expense of Stalin's godlike 
status in the hearts and minds of the CCP members." (54) Moreover, Sheng 
asserts that Stalin saved Mao from many policy disasters. Mao is described by 
Sheng as a "megalomaniac," "egotistic," "emotionally impulsive and 
politically radical." Time and again, it "was Stalin who pulled Mao back from 
his radical and potentially ruinous grandioseness." (3 1) If it was not for Stalin, 
who "provided a balancing mechanism to Mao's often too radical orientation 
... the CCP would have been doomed during the antiJapanese war." (45) 
Indeed, Sheng claims "that after Stalin's death Mao's grandiosity and 
megalomania were set loose, and his personality cult ruined the CCP in the 
process of the Great Leap Forward and the Great Proletarian Cultural 
Revolution." (32) In his estimation, Mao was not "'always correct' . . . [but] a 
rather muddle-headed strategic thinker, poorly informed, with little real 
understanding of world politics." (72) Sheng describes Mao as "more of a 
radical revolutionary inclined to simple solutions, while Stalin was more of a 
tactful statesman." (1 67) 
Despite claims of presenting new evidence, Sheng's account only puts 
a new spin on evidence that has existed for some time. To describe Mao as an 
"Internationalist," a concept that Sheng does not flesh out, in which Mao 
willingly obeyed Stalin's every command and whose basis for leadership was 
Moscow's support is oversimplified. The internal politics of the CCP and Mao 
as an intellectual were much more complicated. Mao's ideology included a 
deep grasp of China's historical and literary past, and he had to struggle for 
power in the organization as much as anyone else. Interestingly, Sheng avoids 
any discussion of the Long March of 1935, a pivotal event in which most 
historians agree that Mao ascended to the leadership of the party against that 
of the twenty-eight Bolsheviks sent by Moscow to take control of the CCP. Yes, 
Mao went along with Stalin because Moscow was the only country around that 
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shared the same ideology and could give Mao aid for his revolution, but going 
along with Stalin does not mean that Mao planned to be controlled by Stalin 
like a puppet. Mao was his own man with his own ideas who had to suffer 
Stalin until he was in a position to run his own country his way, for better or 
worse for the Chinese people. 
Nor does Mao the "internationalist" during the 1930s and 1940s jibe with 
the Mao of post-1949. In the 1920s, Mao spoke of an internationalism in which 
the provinces of China and areas on its borders, such as Tibet, were to declare 
independence and become autonomous. Once Mao was in power, he 
consolidated the CCP's hold on China including Tibet, entered the Korean War 
in order to protect China from American aggression, sought to assert control 
over Taiwan, got into a war with India over a border dispute, and nearly got into 
a war with Russia over a tiny patch a territory. Clearly, as leader, Mao cared 
about China's national interests. Probably because Mao was a "Chinese" 
Communist, not a "Russian" one. 
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